allocation. The burden here will be to show both theoretically and observationally that it is often predictable that only one or a few individuals will experience a relevant external affect even though large numbers experience a real (though irrelevant) externality. Given sufficient variation of interest across the population the impact can be internalized efficiently through private negotiation without exclusion of those who experience irrelevant effects being possible. The result requires that parties experiencing a relevant effect on one side of the interaction be able to identify those who experience a relevant effect on the other side. That identification problem usually is solved if there is a single actor, or but a few, on one side of the interaction, but even when there are many those who experience a relevant impact will frequently be predictable-if an externality affects airlines, one might well approach Delta before Varig to inquire about modifications.
Much research touches Coase's (1960) The Problem of Social Cost (Social Cost henceforth), the origin of the so-called Coase Theorem.
2 But after forty years
Externality, which by rights should be recognized as a major extension, enjoys barely a cult following. Social Cost noted that externalities are less cogently seen as something that one party (the perpetrator) inflicts on others (the victims) than as the unavoidable result of multiple parties' simultaneous attempts to exploit a resource when they are not induced to give (full) weight to the interests of alternative users. Forbidding Jane to do something that would disappoint Dick will disappoint Jane, but denying Dick's appeal to 2 The Theorem was articulated by readers of Social Cost rather than Coase, and exists in several variants. Some deal solely with resource allocation when transaction cost is zero. Social Cost covers a great deal more, subtly building on Coase's (1937) student essay The Nature of the Firm, which exposed the error of neglecting positive transaction cost. Shortly before Social Cost appeared, Coase (1959) discussed the simpler low-transaction-cost/resource-allocation nexus, not as pure theory but as a real world application where transaction cost actually is minor. Social Cost breaks its most meaningful ground regarding entitlement placement precisely when it relaxes the zero transaction cost assumption across its final twothirds, while the initial third aimed to expose severe limitations of Pigouvian taxes (Pigou 1920) . Coase (1988) subsequently responded to a number of chronic confusions regarding Social Cost.
forbid Jane's use leaves Dick disappointed. Since one disappointment is inevitable, identifying the lesser is important. Whether to measure disappointment by willingness to pay in order to avoid it raises additional issues to be sure, 3 but ignoring some disappointments or branding them illegitimate frustrates rational decisionmaking.
Externalities can be pecuniary or non-pecuniary (technological), though aside from public choice theory economics has had little to say about pecuniary ones. 4 A nonpecuniary externality is called positive (or a public good) if it confers benefits, negative if it imposes costs. The concern with negative externalities is that people go too far; with public goods the concern is that people do not go far enough. Positive and negative externalities will be treated interchangeably here-no bystander would or should be expected to invest in aggravating an external cost, but any bystander who mitigates it conveys a positive externality on others who have been suffering. But will those imposing the cost impose too much while those who might mitigate it mitigate too little?
Coase noted frequent misidentification of benefits or costs as externalities though in fact they are internalized-out of self-interest Dick will take account of Jane's preferences whe n deciding his actions if transaction cost is modest, and vice-versa. But to mitigate deleterious external effects if transaction cost is prohibitive, Coase argued that institutions must place entitlements so that no transaction is necessary. This article argues that the need for that institutional involvement is easily overstated.
Legal and cultural institutions are sometimes unable to ascertain and enforce or unwilling to abide the placement of rights necessary to mitigate externalities directly, so externalities could be chronic where transaction cost is high. If law and culture are better at moderating chronic externalities than placing entitlements, beneficial non-market controls remain plausible. For example, economic models indicate that well-designed legal systems ameliorate the external cost of torts (Calabresi 1970; Brown 1973 This article argues that regardless of the perceptiveness of legal and cultural institutions when placing entitlements, and regardless of the level of transaction cost among the universe of the affected, a surprising number of externalities will readily fix themselves. The desirability of corrective intervention is much too easily conceded.
I. The Argument In Outline
The externality literature often focuses on the masses suffering from or enjoying many externalities while despairing of the prospects for taking a careful census, much less gauging individual demands. 7 Comprehensive negotiations would impose overwhelming transaction cost even if individuals had no incentive to misrepresent interest. But if everyone else accurately reported and paid according to private interest, one's own trivial addition would cause barely a ripple; if each of the others, thinking along a similar line, conceals personal demand, one's forlorn bit would finance next to nothing. So the best strategy seems to be concealing one's individual demand, a hightransaction-cost/free-rider "market failure" that seems to imply that too little voluntary funding will materialize for adequate internalization. From that platform a frequent 7 Boudreaux, Meiners, and Zywicki (1999) review the literature and critique frequent overreaching.
recommendation is for government to proxy for the governed, taxing to fund some investment and thus extract us prisoners from our dilemma. The argument undoubtedly is sound within limits, but falls far short of a general rule.
For illustration, timber registers in formal markets and, absent a jointly produced forest-amenity, an unfettered timber market would provide it efficiently. But the amenity registers in formal markets much less comprehensively. especial concern to a fringe present no inevitable high-transaction-cost/free-rider problem-certainly none more daunting than those attending political alternatives-and thus would be irrelevant even if millions of others benefit from the efforts of those few.
Pigou (1920, recommended "bounties and taxes" to deal with "uncompensated services and uncharged disservices," or in modern terminology 9 Or the problem might best be delegated to specialized agencies with borders not coincident with any other political unit's, being either larger than a state-perhaps Washington and Northern California (and British Columbia?) in addition to Oregon-or smaller-Oregon's Willamette Valley might encompass a complete unit. More external effects would no doubt spill across the borders of a smaller unit, but it would simultaneously provide information and agency cost offsets while mitigating the monopoly potential of geographically large sovereigns. So the matter is cost versus benefit rather than black versus white (Haddock 1997). subsidies and taxes for public goods and negative externalities. 10 Economists if not the public are comfortable optimizing rather than eradicating externalities and came to see a tax that was to equal an external cost or a subsidy that was to equal an external benefit as the most direct way to go about it. Social Cost pointed out inter alia that such externalities would be internalized without legal intervention if transaction cost is low, and that a Pigouvian tax or subsidy then could actually induce overreaction. But since negotiation cost becomes prohibitive when too many people must participate, most economists continue to see a properly calibrated Pigouvian tax or subsidy as desirable whenever a great number of people are affected by an externality.
Such a conclusion arises from an implicit assumption that all those parties are identical. With private goods, that assumption serves merely to simplify analysis. But the assumption is critical when externalities are analyzed. Pigouvian taxes and subsidies can prove inadvisable if variance of interest is high across individuals even if a large population is affected by an externality. To make that point more rigorously the article will employ a simple graphical model of a public good. The model assumes enforceable rights over physical property, but no right to prevent passersby from viewing it. Though a reasonably malleable analogue fitting many externalities, the model is inapplicable if property rights are absent or unenforced, as with poaching or much rainforest destruction.
The model indicates that private parties will often (not always) better internalize externalities than any diligent, honest bureaucracy could even be imagined doing. One crippling bureaucratic disadvantage is that many external costs and benefits are 10 Though Pigou is best remembered for taxes and subsidies directed at private-sector externalities, the relevant discussion occurs in a chapter cumbersomely entitled Divergences Between Marginal Social Net Product and Marginal Trade Net Product that focused mainly on the distorting effects of monopoly and common if inadvisable government policies, with externalities more-or-less an afterthought.
subjective and thus knowable only to the demander or supplier, while the links from production to consumption skirt formal markets where objective proxies might be observed (Hayek1945). 11 Though the argument would be strengthened, it rarely touches the public choice literature questioning whether a bureaucracy would even endeavor to optimize what appears to be its charge. In contrast, private initiative is capable of internalizing an unforeseen range of externalities that affect large numbers of individuals.
II. Private and Public Goods: Whose View Is Eccentric?
Imagine asking a non-economist to parse a list of assets and services into mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories called private goods and public goods.
Given those constraints it seems likely that things owned by identifiable humans or companies would be placed in the private goods list, but doubtful that something owned by the government would be categorized as a private good. In addition to government property, the person might plausibly categorize what an economist would call an open access resource in the public good group. If so, a deep-sea fish would be seen as transformed from a public to a private good as it is brought aboard a fisherman's boat.
Hypnotized by precedent, some drudge might note that similar answers could likely have been had well before The Wealth of Nations (Smith 1776) initiated modern economics.
The economic meanings of public and private goods are only teasingly related to that common parlance, though now perhaps too ingrained to alter. The term private good (would that it had been called a rivalous good) makes an economist think of something such as an apple for which consumption by one person forecloses consumption by 11 Thus policymakers frequently resort to survey results rather than market data. But survey respondents do not put their money where their mouths are, and often return either zero or unrealistically high valuations with little variation across a wide range of amenities, in addition to cross-amenity comparisons that are inconsistent, intransitive, or sensitive to query order and wording (Adler and Posner (2000) .
anyone else-eaten apples inevitably become someone's private calories, even mess hall apples sitting on the counter while being offered to soldiers in the government's army.
Private goods pose a rationing problem, solved in a market through the price mechanism (though the army more often resorts to fiat or rationing-by-waiting).
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Nearly every demand bears a significant relationship to the ideal quantity of a private good, so there would ordinarily be a welfare loss if the market ignored some of them. To see why envision the only region where a nation's timber and cattle can be produced. It is uniformly worth exploiting for one of the products while other products can be produced profitably only in other regions. All markets are competitive. 12 The substitution of queues for prices as a rationing device is discussed in Barzel (1974) . Production is fixed proportions so a demand curve's horizontal axis can be redefined as the land area necessary to produce that quantity of the product. Figure 1 illustrates.
Welfare Loss From Excluding a Private Good Demand
The horizontal axis between the alternative origins 0 t and 0 c shows the region's total area. Distance from the left-hand origin measures timber production, which with fixed proportions is proportional to forested area, while distance from the right-hand origin measures cattle production, or equivalently pastureland. The price of a land unit's output, net of the cost of all other required inputs, is measured vertically. 13 The respective marginal net value curves for timber and cattle are shown as MV t and MV c .
An unfettered market will have marginal net value of forest equal to marginal net value of pasture, dividing the region into areas 0 t A of forest and 0 c A of pasture with land rent of R per unit area. The area under the two curves then consists of a rectangle below R that goes to landowners and two triangles above R that represent consumer surplus.
An embargo on foreign timber sales redivides the region into areas 0 t A e and 0 c A e and lowers land rent to R e if MV td shows the marginal net value curve of domestically consumed timber. The reduction from R to R e is mainly a pecuniary transfer from landowners to domestic consumers, though with some deadweight loss of producer surplus as shown by the triangle abc. With the curves shown, however, the major welfare loss is of the consumer surplus of foreign timber buye rs, shown by triangle bcd. Only if the foreign demand were so weak that (net of non-land costs) it intersected the vertical axis below R e would the welfare loss evaporate, though an embargo then would seem pointless since foreigners would have been purchasing no domestic timber to begin with.
That illustrates that it is relevant whether individual private good demands intersect the vertical axis above the market price. The only ones that can be ignored costlessly belong to individuals who would not consume the good anyway.
In contrast, in the vocabulary of economics a public good is merely non-rivalous in consumption even when it is privately owned and supplied, perhaps a television program that can be enjoyed by many viewers-the entire public even-without depreciating anyone's enjoyment. Again the economic definition makes the good's provider or owner irrelevant. 14 A soldier eating a mess hall apple removes it from every other opportunity set, but a soldier enjoying a CBS broadcast does not. Since each person must have his own units in order to consume private goods, the observer aggregates the interest of the entire market by adding everyone's quantity demanded at every alternative monetary price. But an indefinite number of people share consumption of the same unit of a public good, so the observer aggregates the market interest by adding everyone's monetary valuation at every alternative quantity. 15 Everyone is able to consume up to the total amount of a collective good that happens to be produced, even anyone who chances to be unrecognized by whatever process produces it. That does not assure the optimal amount will be forthcoming, but it may be-many individual demands for collective goods can be ignored while inducing no welfare loss, as shown below.
III. A Public Good Privately Enjoyed
Many different activities occupy our planet's surface, some compatiblepassersby enjoy a mountain vista across a pasture while oil is pumped from beneath-but 14 "Many public goods are provided by private entities (most radio programs in the United States for example) while governments often provide private goods (such as seats in sports stadiums)" (Haddock and Kiesling 2002) .
15 Demsetz (1970) .
others incompatible-the pasture and its cattle preclude a shopping center on that site.
While compatible uses can overlap, increased area in one use imposes a corresponding decrease on incompatible ones.
A. A Drab If Lucrative Island Life
A rancher single-handedly owns and operates an island in the region discussed earlier, regarding it solely as a tool for maximizing pecuniary profit. No one else visits or cares about the island so the production of timber and beef result solely in private goods.
Government policy is neutral. The island produces too little to affect prices, so it might plausibly be specialized to produce only timber or only cattle. But suppose that the factor requirements for the alternatives have distinct time profiles so that cattle are most demanding when the forest is least so, which counters economies of specialization. Due to the seasonal production disjunction between cattle and timber the net value of marginal land units will be a decreasing function of the area devoted to either output.
Analogously to figure 1, figure 2 shows forest measured from an origin 0 t and pasture measured from 0 c , with distance between indicating the island's area. 16 Putting aside land's endogenous opportunity cost, the marginal net value of timber (MV t ) begins high along the left axis-the opportunity costs of the non-land inputs are low for the first units devoted to forest because most work occurs when cattle compete for little attention.
As the forest expands however, non-land inputs must be diverted from increasingly weighty cattle-tending duties, as reflected in the downward slope along the MV t curve for movements to the right. Analogous considerations apply to the marginal net value of 16 Figure 2 is adapted from Dnes and Lueck (2002) .
cattle (MV c ). Maximizing the island's value yields a product boundary at A max . Assume that A max has long characterized the island's comprehensively renewable production.
B. Internalities: Even Cowgirls Get the Blues
The isolated rancher notices a less lonely feeling while within her forest. Timber and cattle receipts remain objectively comparable but the rancher is both producer and consumer of the newfound forest amenity. There is thus no objective measure to contrast its marginal benefit with any pecuniary cost. Discovering all the relevant objective information would be an insuperable task; discovering all relevant subjective information would be impossible. So only the rancher can ascertain the island's optimal use pattern.
If added forest creates additional amenity value for the rancher for areas larger than A max the boundary will move. Because MV t = MV c at A max the marginal cost of expanding the forest amenity is locally zero, whereas the marginal amenity value MV ar , which the rancher alone can calibrate, has become positive. The rancher will move the boundary to A * where MV c -MV t = MV ar . The area abc represents the implicit cost of expanding the amenity while the area abcd shows the aggregate amenity value that results. 17 Buchanan and Stubblebine discuss relevant versus irrelevant solely in the context of externalities, but the concept is more broadly useful-there are no externalities in figure 2 but the amenity is relevant to the rancher's decision. For brevity call the amenity boundary relevant, meaning the rancher's demand is more extensive than A max , where extensiveness will be defined as the quantity where marginal amenity value reaches zero, at E r for the rancher.
Judging from a great number of policy statements, it must come as a surprise that the amenity may have no bearing on the optimal island division. The rancher may see only part of the island at any moment, and her demand for the amenity may be inframarginal and thus irrelevant for deciding the forest-pasture division as in figure 3 .
The intersection of the marginal value of cattle-producing land with the pecuniary marginal value of timberland at A max occurs to the right of E r . The amenity is real but has no impact-it is boundary IRrelevant. Like oxygen, an externality can be important but irrelevant at the margin. Perhaps the rancher cherishes few things more than her woodland, but becomes satiated before marginal amenity value has any impact on her 17 Even if constant or increasing, marginal amenity value would be boundary relevant. As the figure has been drawn, marginal amenity value and marginal timber value reach zero at the same area, though that is mere drafting convenience. The amenity could provide utility even after marginal timber value became negative. That could induce the rancher to maintain so much forest that her accountant would lament the marginal profit being lost. Some owners of professional athletic teams subsidize from other income team accounting losses, thus involving the owner in what is to an extent a hobby. Though arguing strenuously about which sign to attach, journalists, team owners, and even the players' unions nonetheless characterize negative versus positive accounting profits as somehow dis positive regarding the desirability of proposed league reforms. They are not. (And commentators accuse economists of failing to see past the dollar sign!) production decisions. The rancher enjoys as much amenity as she wants while sacrificing nary a cent of market income. Those best things in life that actually are free (impose no opportunity cost) pose no economic problem and beg for no solution.
Some commentators object that the marginal value of an amenity can never fall to zero, that inevitably more is better than less. That argument confuses unconstrained preference with marginal value, and rational choice is impossible on that basis. The valuable things one would give up to have a bit more measures marginal value, and there is a limited amount to give up to obtain anything.
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18 A mathematician objects that a positive marginal value converging rapidly on zero permits infinite forest of finite value. A law court answers that such a marginal value quickly attains insignificance, holding the mathematician in contempt for wasting time. An economist mentions that the economics of information (Stigler 1961) holds that time -constrained people would not register trivial values, but is held in contempt for redundancy. To a tolerance finer than frogs' hair all marginal values reach the horizontal axis.
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Marginal Net Value The model assumed away so many complications that no Kaldor-Hicks policy issues have arisen. This section corrects that by letting others enjoy the forest amenity.
A. Externalities: Public Goods With or Without a Public
Vessels begin passing. The sailors admire the forested view, thus sharing an amenity previously enjoyed solely by the rancher. As discussed above, calling the amenity a public good is perverse-a view of the island forest was already a public good according to the economic definition even when the "public" consisted solely of the rancher. Her act of viewing left the view unaltered for anyone else wanting to take a peek (which happened to be nobody until the boats came along-details, details).
The rancher is not legally entitled to a fee from offshore viewers, so the public good forest-amenity is a collective good. If no individual realizes sufficient benefit from expanding the forest an appropriate tax-expenditure scheme might offer a Kaldor-Hicks improvement. 19 But the sailors, being offshore, would see less of the island than the rancher and see it less often. Similarly she might value a finer texture to the beauty than the sailors could resolve from their greater distance. Thus the rancher might value a more extensive amenity than do the sailors and value the amenity more highly than would any sailor, perhaps more highly even than all the sailors together. The sailors might be satiated with less forest than the rancher has selected solely to maximize her personal utility. Any additional units cultivated to satisfy the rancher beyond what satiated the 19 Interestingly, with fewer sailors the amenity value of the island's forest would be reduced but free riding would pose less barrier to obtaining it-both rancher and a single or handful of sailors might recognize that they would each have to contribute or too little financing would be available. There would remain a transaction cost, but even that is expected to decrease with the number of negotiating parties. Paradoxically, the minor Kaldor-Hicks improvement would seem easier to achieve than the major one.
sailors would comprise a public good in the economist's non-rivalous sense, but the public interest could hardly be implicated. No opportunity to free ride arises if only the rancher values additional forest, nor does transaction cost create a market failure. The sailors cannot be excluded but the size of the forest is optimal anyway.
Thus no tax-expenditure scheme may be necessary to achieve the optimal collective good, forest amenity-the rancher may select it of her own volition. A positive externality certainly exists since the sailors can view the forest while bearing none of its cost, but it is irrelevant. In fact, if the rancher could exclude sailors from viewing her forest but could not price discriminate among them, her profit-maximizing demand would likely leave some sailors unwilling to pay such a high price for the forest-amenity/publicgood despite the positive value they would place on viewing it. But she can exclude no one if they stay offshore, so there will be the same amount of amenity value whether or not the sailors' interest is known to her. Contrary to expectation, the public goods problem could be less problematic if exclusion is infeasible.
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The rancher would prefer compensation for providing an amenity while taxpayers would prefer to make none. If the costless information assumption is relaxed compensation is prone to miscalculation. In part that is because so many costs and benefits are subjective, but policy initiatives pose objective hurdles as well. The cost of increased forest would depend (among many other things) on the prices of cattle and hay and transport as surely as on the price of timber. Economic costs are not dollars but the 20 Baumol (2002, 126-35) demonstrates that in the instance of one sort of public good-innovation-some degree of non-excludability (seemingly on the order of 80%) is both inevitable and plausibly Pareto optimal. Baumol's mechanism-complementarities between innovators and non-innovating workersdiffers from the relevance/irrelevance distinction emphasized here, though where his externalities fall in the Pareto optimal range they seem also to be irrelevant in the Buchanan & Stubblebine sense. "The results … reconcile the market economies' allegedly inefficient innovation performance, which the standard theory leads us to expect, and their historically unprecedented growth record (Baumol 2002, 122) ."
value of the multifarious opportunities foregone, which are difficult to gauge by those remote from the activities.
B. Could Two Million Sailors Be Wrong?
The intuition that more users inevitably require more of a good betrays careless thinking. Given willingness to pay at least marginal production cost it is indeed efficient that all private good demands have an impact on output, as illustrated above. But weaker demands have no impact on the optimal amount of a public good. If the public good is a collective good, those with the most extensive demands will if necessary pay for so much of it that those with less extensive demands lose interest in having more. 21 Those with inframarginal demands value the good-perhaps they enjoy few things more keenly-but they are satiated before their preferences have any impact on optimal provision. They enjoy as much as they want (thus until marginal value to them has fallen to zero) without requiring the expenditure of a cent more than is required to satisfy marginal demands.
The arrival of boats carrying forest-loving sailors may or may not alter the optimal pasture-forest division. If not, the amenity remains important to the sailors but their demand is boundary-irrelevant. But suppose their arrival makes the ideal woodland larger (creates or strengthens boundary-relevance). Still no policy issue arises if that is reflected in the rancher's voluntary decisions. Consider those points in turn.
Boundary Relevance: To alter the optimal amenity it is necessary and sufficient that the most extensive of the sailors' demands exceed A max if the rancher's amenity demand is boundary irrelevant or A * if the rancher's demand is boundary relevant. If the rancher's demand is boundary irrelevant figures 2 and 3 suffice as illustration by substituting MV as , the margina l amenity value to the most extensively interested sailor, for MV ar , the marginal amenity value to the rancher.
But if the rancher's demand is boundary relevant a sailor may have an impact on the ideal amount even with a less extensive demand than the ranc her's, as figure 4 illustrates. E r shows the extensiveness of the boundary-relevant rancher demand that led to forest area A * in figure 2. Though the most extensive sailor's demand intersects the horizontal axis at E s < E r the ideal boundary moves from A * to A †
. If the rancher does not make that adjustment there will be a loss as shown by the area abc. The frequent inclination to restrict focus to the missing amenity, area A † bcA * , overstates that loss (perhaps grossly) because the opportunity cost of lost cattle production, area A * abA † , is 
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The Rancher's Reaction: If transaction cost were modest the rancher would move the boundary to A † of her own volition because she would be paid to do so by those enjoying the marginally enhanced amenity. But with a potentially large group of sailors offshore enjoying the amenity, how likely is transaction cost to be low?
The amenity being a collective good, low transaction cost is more likely than it might seem. With a private good the number of necessary consumer-producer interactions depends on the intersection of individual demand curves with the vertical axis in comparison with market price. But for a public good, including the collective good subset, the intersection of less extensive demands with the horizontal axis matters in comparison with the quantity secured by more extensive demands. Assuming no price discrimination, with private goods everyone pays the same price for different quantities (possibly zero), whereas with collective goods everyone receives the same quantity for different prices (possibly zero). Sailors will have varying demands, and sometimes the second most extensive will not reach A † and will therefore be boundary irrelevant.
Then it hardly matters how many sailors are offshore, two or two million; only the most extensive sailor's demand is boundary relevant, and one rancher negotiating with that lone especially interested sailor compels no expectation of prohibitive transaction cost. Most people bear that level of transaction cost (and more) virtually nonstopbuying a house, buying a car, attracting a spouse, negotiating for a job, allocating fence repairs between neighbors, having a suit properly tailored, and so on. Transaction cost might be prohibitive if, for example, the rancher and sailor speak different languages, but that is not a factor that provides a distinction between public and private goods. Even if several sailors have boundary-relevant demands the cost of resorting to government might as easily dwarf the cost of a private multiparty negotiation as the converse.
Negotiating with two million sailors would almost certainly be prohibitive, but in figure 4 pointless. Imagine what would be discovered if new technology reduced transaction cost to zero? That after the rancher has satisfied herself and one or a few sailors, nobody else would pay one iota to expand the forest amenity further. The level of many-party transaction cost is irrelevant if (1) no sailor has a boundary relevant demand, or (2) transaction cost between the rancher and a few relevant sailors is modest.
The rancher already is attuned to the local cattle and timber markets, to local transport, to the prices of hay and all the other inputs she uses, and thus can cheaply judge the opportunity cost of forest expansion. Bureaucrats can find objective information for some of that but collecting it is costly. Moreover, the few boundary relevant sailors are the only reliable judges of the subjective value to them of the amenity, just as the rancher is the only reliable judge of the additional amenity value to her. And that actually understates the bureaucrat's problem. Suppose that the bureaucracy hits A † on the nose. None of the curves are likely to be static but will shift constantly with changing market prices of cattle, timber, hay, transport, and the like along with the subjective preferences of those with boundary-relevant demands. Thus even a perfectly selected area is unlikely to remain perfect. Of course, a tolerable bureaucratic estimate yesterday implies that a tolerable one is plausible tomorrow. But that requires canvassing those affected in one way or another, hence once again obtaining costly information that private participants already possess. Due in part to that greater information cost bureaucratic policy tends toward inflexibility and episodic but large changes.
Transaction cost for collective goods-even those demonstrably enjoyed by millions-are chronically overestimated in policy discussions. Only one or a few strong demands often determine both actual and ideal provision, and even two million demands are irrelevant if inframarginal.
C. But What About Yellowstone Park?
Surely there are enough marginal demanders for, say, Yellowstone National Park to frustrate optimal private provision. Perhaps. Speaking counterfactually, present congestion in Yellowstone might have arisen because high transaction cost frustrated private efforts; speaking factually, it did materialize despite a century and a third of government pre-emption of private efforts. 23 We have little evidence regarding private amenity provision in Yellowstone, though initially people were able to enjoy it solely through efforts of three private railroad companies, the Union Pacific, the Burlington, and the Milwaukee (Anderson and Hill 1994; 1996) . Motivated by company, not public, benefit, the railroads then lobbied for national government (and treasury) involvement.
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All that is beside the point. Though Yellowstone amenities are a public good during low season they are not a collective good-non-payers are excluded at the gate.
But so many members of the public (in the ordinary sense) are enjoying the park during 23 Congress reserved the area now in Yellowstone National Park in 1872, but until the National Park Service was created in 1916 such reserves were administered directly by the Department of the Interior. 24 Similarly, a recent Public Broadcasting System series reveals that railroad companies were instrumental in opening both the south (Santa Fe) and north (Union Pacific) rims of the Grand Canyon, as well as the areas that became Zion and Bryce Canyon National Parks (Union Pacific again 
D. Two Meanings of Free Range Bison
There is danger of strategic breakdown with even a few boundary-relevant demanders. To extract compensation from the sailors, perhaps the forest-loving rancher will threaten a sizeable conversio n to pasture, or the sailor with the most extensive demand will refuse to negotiate with the rancher unless other sailors contribute.
Prohibitive transaction cost rules out making such threats credible against two million targets because they will be unable to organize collection of the demanded funds, but the rancher might focus on one or a few sailors, or one sailor might focus on a few of his fellows. Suppose that such a threat is successful. Wealth is transferred but the amenity is not curtailed, so no efficiency loss results (Demsetz 1972) .
But knowing whom to threaten and then communicating the threat is costly. If the expected cost exceeds whatever compensation is expected to result no threat would be lodged. If it is too costly for the rancher to identify a boundary relevant sailor the sailor must self-identify or his dissatisfaction will be permanent. 26 It is possible that a sailor would bide his time hoping that some other sailor who might conceivably have a boundary relevant demand will come forward, but every period of unfulfilled waiting imposes a cost on him. A Nirvana ideal outcome is not guaranteed, but the outcome may be optimal. The distinction between ideal and optimal often is forgotten. Chronic externalities often are less than ideal, but may well be optimal. Ideal (or Nirvana efficient) requires perfection while optimal merely requires beating realistic alternatives, and though externality-riddled markets are less than perfect so too are norms and law.
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Well-informed people would prefer to live with an externality rather than bear more serious consequences attending misguided "corrective" intervention.
If the public good were excludable as in the book market, prohibitive costs of discriminating might deny those with weak demands the opportunity to enjoy the public good even though the marginal cost of serving them would be nearly zero. But that is impossible with collective goods such as existence values, views from a public way, carbon sinks, or reductions of atmospheric pollution-whatever collective good the rancher provides for herself is available to all, so the others either accept it or negotiate for more. Those with boundary irrelevant demands will accept the outcome while anyone 26 This is the point at which it becomes germane that the boundary relevant parties be able to identify each other. Transaction cost is indeed apt to be daunting if one or a few boundary relevant sailors from among two million cannot easily discern which of, say, one thousand ranchers are similarly boundary relevant.
with a boundary relevant demand must bring that to the attention of the rancher and negotiate for an increase or risk a continuing stream of personal loss. With a collective good any negotiated increase also is available to everyone.
The cost of a breakdown will be borne solely by those with boundary-relevant demands. If there is substantial variance in demands only one or a few individuals, the ones most likely to provide the collective good voluntarily, will have boundary-relevant demands. Discovering and threatening someone who will pay less than the cost of carrying out the threat makes no sense. A cartel that contemplates a price war against an "undisciplined" fringe faces an analogous problem-war could cost the cartel more than it costs the targets, so tolerating an undisciplined fringe is often profit maximizing for a Turner has made all investments in the Flying D that were worth more to him personally than they cost him, and the marginal value of improvements to the rest of us has been driven to zero. Drivers free ride on his efforts but it hardly matters. The ranch will be the same either way, or at least passersby would perceive no difference.
V. Conclusion
I clean the counter of the faculty commons and a perplexed colleague calls to those round about, "Look, an economist providing a public good!" 28 Apparently the mess bothers me more than it bothers them, for I learned soon after arrival at
Northwestern that all I had to do was wait long enough and-nothing would happen. If I want to enjoy a clean countertop I had better bear the cost whether or not slobs share the improvement. A few of them do not even notice, and the others care too little to contribute. Similar behavior is all around, but except for a few economists such as Anderson and Leal (2001) the profession thinks it aberrational-received theory does not encompass it and thus the zeitgeist has been unconducive to searches that would surely have revealed evidence on point (Trefil 1989, 31-42) .
Economics has long been vexed by externalities, positive and negative. The distinction between private and societal interest is well understood for pecuniary externalities, but the same distinction has rarely been acknowledged for non-pecuniary ones affecting large populations. But it is important to recognize the difference between a problem and an inconvenience.
"Life is inconvenient. Life is lumpy. You learn to know the difference between an inconvenience and a problem. You'll live longer. … ." Problem or inconvenience? I call this the [Auschwitz survivor Sigmund] Wollman Test of Reality. Life is lumpy. But a lump in the oatmeal-a lump in the throat-and a lump in the breast-are not the same lump. We should learn to know the difference (Zulia 1999, 46) ."
Certainly ideal public policy would recognize externalities-but it would only endeavor to correct those that are relevant at the margin. They surround us but rarely lead to resource misallocation. Ill-considered efforts to regulate them will.
If Jane purchases a book for thirty but would have paid forty she has received a consumer surplus of ten. If a publisher who is freeing inventory space gives it away her surplus is forty. But if Dick receives free or pays only ten for a collective good when he would have paid forty many economists think it a market failure. The book market also embeds a public good in part. Though some books are never published because too little of a substantial surplus can be captured to cover overhead, most manuscripts that languish could not cover overhead if all surplus were captured. It is easy to distinguish the two on paper but difficult in practice, and would be even mo re difficult if the treasury paid all publication costs so no market data was generated. With both literature and collective goods, overhead can often be covered privately. Consumers share the surplus without which it would hardly matter whether something could be produced. Why think that producers should have it all (Baumol 2002, 120-48) ?
Too centralized a response can gut a process of its ability to gauge demand, to identify those who might volunteer contribution, and to mitigate bureaucratic agency cost along with the monopolistic aspects of unitary government (Haddock 1997) . The idealperfection-is easily recognized but the optimum inevitably will lie elsewhere. At the end of the day, sufficient conditions and necessary conditions are different. Low transaction cost is sufficient to justify leaving decision-making in private hands, but it is not necessary. Much mischief arises from a misperception that transaction cost is high where it is not, or that some enjoy a free ride though they cannot (Anderson 20##) . But
